

# Lukács' Later Works and the Drawbacks of his Intellectual Itinerary<sup>1</sup>

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According to Tertulian (1971, p.15), Lukács has become the most outstanding personality of contemporary Marxist culture. In fact, in the introduction to the essay "*What is Orthodox Marxism*" (1919), published in *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), again following Tertulian, Lukács formulated a thesis that revealed his basic theoretical orientation from his transition years to Marxism. Therein he referred to the discussions that animated the contemporary intellectual circles around the authentic definition of 'orthodox Marxism'. He argued that a serious Marxist could accept, in principle, by way of hypothesis, the inaccuracy of all the particular statements of Marx and recognize the need to replace them by new research findings without for a moment ceasing to be an orthodox Marxist. A paradoxical affirmation which represented a polemical attitude towards a 'dogmatic' conception of Marxism. Authentic Marxism could not be identified with an automatic adherence and fidelity to the results of Marx's research, with 'faith' in one thesis or another, with the exegesis of a 'sacred' creation. When it came to Marxism, orthodoxy had to do exclusively with the problem of *method*. The distinction could appear very subtle or simply unfounded. But the statement was intended to underline the *philosophical* dimension of Marxism. Finally, Lukács rejected the infallibility of all certainties of a scholastic or dogmatic kind. Thus, in principle, every particular result of research is susceptible of being completed, modified or enriched. The *or-thodoxy* in Marxism meant to affirm that Marx had found an adequate research method, a method that could be developed, perfected or deepened. It thus aimed at underlining the philosophical nature of this method and its fundamental non-dogmatism.

And, again according to Tertulian, yet, the mere “possession” of a superior instrument is not in itself a guarantee of cultural superiority and, in this sense, on a certain occasion Lukács stated that Montaigne would be more interesting than a mediocre Marxist.

But one question remains since his posthumously published works: Why does Lukács insist on dealing with such an unusual theme in his mature work, the possible existence of an ontology in Marx? For a question that was fatally received with great strangeness, even by his most beloved disciples? A question that has aroused and is still arousing immediate disapproval from all sides, the disapproval *in limini* of those who claim to be interested parties in such matters, who would regard it as inadmissible, why insist on this 'exotic' problem?

First of all, it must be acknowledged that the 20th century took up or faced Marx's thought from a gnosiological standpoint, without asking itself whether or not it would be compatible with such an approach, but assuming that it was, on the basis of the presuppositions of conventional scientificity. Yet, this first assumption leads to a second, that of contemporary general anti-criticism, whereby scientism rests and must rest on some kind of gnosiological foundation (theory of knowledge, logic or epistemology).

It is not the case here of resuming in detail the author's extensive and sinuous intellectual trajectory. It is not the case here of going back in detail to the author's extensive and winding intellectual trajectory. Already in an article, availing myself, once again, of Tertulian's testimony, I pointed out that “the intellectual evolution of Georg Lukács offers a unique picture of the formation and development of a personality in the turbulent conditions

of a century no less unique for its complexity and the dramatic character of its history” (VAISMAN, 2005; TERTULIAN, 1971, p.15).

It is difficult to determine the theoretical core of Lukács in a few lines, both before his adherence to Marxism and its possible repercussions, and afterwards, because the author “went through the most varied and heterogeneous spiritual experiences” (ibidem), such that one of the controversial issues is that which concerns the continuities and discontinuities of his thought. It is not our place here to dwell on this important theme, but we cannot omit to mention the polemical thesis of “those who consider the 'true Lukács' to be the one of his youth and that the mature phase of his work, that is, the rigorously Marxist phase, would constitute an evident involution” (ibidem). Moreover, it is fundamental to mention another problem, always remembered and linked to the polemical trajectory of the author: his 'self-criticisms'. Although this is not the most adequate moment to discuss this problem, it would be interesting to focus on the subject from another point of view, perhaps more fruitful, by asking the following:

What other contemporary thinker has been able to renounce critically and deliberately, as he did several times, the prestige of acclaimed works? Renunciation that has reached the point of total divorce from them, to the point of manifesting complete authorial detachment from texts that would have made, each one of them by themselves, the unquestionable and always desired career glory of anyone, including the best and most respectable. This detachment, synonymous with enormous demand on himself, which never declined in arrogance or pedantry, nor in self-proclamations of merit or in bravado of self-sufficiency, despite the immense theoretical solitude to which his work was confined. (VAISMAN, 2005, p.294)

Georg Lukács was born in 1885, in the district of Leopoldstadt, Bucharest, as the author informs us in his *Lived Thought—Auto-biography as a dialogue*.<sup>2</sup> His first book, published in 1911, was entitled *The History of the Development of Modern Drama*, winning a literary prize then. At this stage in his youth, what the author was looking for was “a form of interpretation of literary manifestations that was not a mere abstraction of their peculiar contents. Hence, in the theoretical opposition in which he found himself and adhering to neo-Kantianism, he did not go beyond, at that time, the equation set up in *The History of the Evolution of Modern Drama*: that of the pure intellectual synthesis between sociology and aesthetics, under the support of Simmel's thought, instead of starting from 'the direct and real relations between society and literature', as he would say in the Preface to *Art and Society*. Where he also states that 'it cannot be surprising that from such an artificial position abstract constructions have been derived', always unsatisfactory, especially when they attain some true determination” (idem, p.295-6).

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2 This was an interview with István Eörsi and Erzsébet Vézer, from an outline written by Lukács. Eörsi explains in an introductory note to the reader: “When Georg Lukács was informed of his fatal illness, he made extraordinary efforts to quickly complete the corrections to his work *For an Ontology of Social Being*. The rapid deterioration of his condition prevented him, however, from carrying out this task, so important to him, with the intensity to which he was accustomed. At this time he set about writing the outline of his life, partly because of the lesser theoretical wear and partly to satisfy a wish of his late wife. Once the outline was ready, it became clear he would not have enough strength to write. The very activity of writing proved to be a task that increasingly exceeded his physical strength. However, as he could not bear to live without working, he followed the advice of his closest students and recounted his life in recorded conversations as he answered, with growing physical decay, the questions that Erzsébet Vezér and I asked him on the basis of his biographical sketch.” (LUKÁCS, 1999, p.25). Edition directly translated from the original German (LUKÁCS, 1981). There is also the French edition (LUKÁCS, 1986) and the Italian one (LUKÁCS, 1983).

However, it was only with the publication of *The Soul and Forms* (1911) that the Hungarian philosopher “caught the attention of several members of the European elite.” [...] “The last essay of the book ... which many commentators consider to be the most essential of the whole—was devoted to the apology of tragedy. In the eyes of the young Lukács, tragedy appeared as the embodiment taken to the ultimate consequences of essentialized life, as the supreme mode of articulation of this form ... in which he saw the inalienable condition of true art” (TERTULIAN, 1971, p. 17).

Subsequently, he published *The Theory of the Novel* (1914/15; Brazil LUKÁCS, 2000), which, together with *The Soul and the Forms*, represents the Lukácsian transit from Kant to Hegel which culminates in the latter. It is the path that leads him, without abandoning the territory of the so-called sciences of the spirit (Dilthey, Simmel, Weber), from Simmel's philosophy and nascent German sociology to a form of science of the spirit coupled or transgressed by Hegelianism, responsible for the warp of *The Soul and the Forms* and with greater accentuation in *The Theory of the Novel*. Moreover, these works emerged under the direct or indirect influence of the “aestheticism of the philosophy of life (*Lebensphilosophie*), which predominated in German thought at the beginning of the last century” (TERTULIAN, 1971, p. 20).

The outbreak of the '14 War and its effect on the left-wing intelligentsia, as it was overtaken by social democracy, determined the project of writing *The Theory of the Novel*. This “was born of a state of mind of permanent despair at the world situation,” says Lukács (1975, p. 182), who more than once used Friedte's formula to characterize the image he nurtured of that time: “the time of consummated sinfulness” (LUKÁCS,

1999, p.49). This infernal vision of a Europe without gaps and without horizons, woven of ethically modulated pessimism, makes the Lukács of *The Theory of the Novel* an early utopian, to use an almost identical expression of his own use. So much so that he can state: "*The Theory of the Novel* is not conservative, but destructive" (idem, 1975, p. 49). And more concretely: "methodologically, it is a book of the history of the spirit. But I think it is the only book on the history of the spirit that is not right-wing. From a moral point of view, I consider all that time to be condemnable and, in my conception, art is good when it is opposed to that course" (idem, 1999, p. 49).

It is not possible here to go into greater detail about this important phase of the author's life, but it is necessary to add that "the intellectual development of Lukács is of unique interest, having a paradigmatic value for the destiny of the European intellectuals of the twentieth century" (TERTULIAN, 1971, p. 25).

Some interpreters of Lukács, such as Oldrini (2002) and Tertulian (2002), consider that Lukács' mature phase begins in 1930, when the philosopher began to devote himself to his studies on art, with the orientation of an analytical key based on Marx's thought. Oldrini, in an attempt to discover the moment in which began the process that led Lukács to write his posthumously published work, makes use of statements by the Soviet critic Michail Lifschitz<sup>3</sup> and of the Hungarians István Herman,

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3 Aesthete and philosopher with whom Lukács lived during the first of his exiles in the Soviet Union. In the Preface to his volume *Art and Society* published 1968 in Budapest, he states: "At the Marx-Engels Institute I met and worked with Michail Lifschitz, with whom, in the course of long and friendly conversations, I debated the fundamental questions of Marxism. The most important theoretical result of this clarification was the recognition of the existence of an autonomous and unitary Marxist aesthetic. This affirmation, indisputable today, seemed at the beginning of the 1930s a paradox even for many Marxists" (LUKÁCS, 1981a, v. I, p. 11). It is important to remember that in this field, the

who had been one of Lukács' first students, and László Szikai, director of the Lukács Archive in Budapest. Such testimonies "have insisted with particular emphasis on the 'historical importance' of the 1930s turn, on the fact that—without a shadow of a doubt—it was precisely there, in Moscow, that the mature Lukács was being formed" (OLDRINI, 2002, p.52-3). It is well known that in the first round of exiles in Moscow, which took place in early 1930, Lukács worked with Riazanov, who was then responsible for the edition of the young Marx's manuscripts and the publication of MEGA, which was left incomplete with his expulsion in 1931 from the CPUS and its subsequent disappearance during the Stalinist purges. It was a more than unusual experience, probably responsible for his inflection towards Marxian thought, which he remembered with great enthusiasm to the very end of his life, as he said, for example, in an interview to *New Left Review* in 1968: 'When I was in Moscow in 1930, Riazanov showed me the manuscripts of Marx written in Paris in 1844. You can imagine my excitement: reading these manuscripts changed my whole relationship with Marxism and transformed my philosophical perspective.' According to Oldrini, this turn of events has an ontological character, inasmuch as it is based on Marx's critique of Hegel's speculative philosophy, in which Marx, partly influenced by Feuerbach's short writings, recognizes objectivity as the original property of every being.<sup>4</sup> Oldrini considers, in this sense, that

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conceptions proper to the framework of ideas formulated by the Second International still prevailed.

- 4 Lukács (1999, p. 145) takes the following position on this subject: "Marx elaborated primarily—and this I consider the most important part of Marxian theory—the thesis according to which the fundamental characteristic of social being, and this is true of all being, is that it is historical. In the Parisian manuscripts, Marx says that there is only one science, that is, history, and he even adds: "A non-objective being is a non-being. That is, there cannot be a thing that has no categorical qualities. Existing, therefore, implies that something exists in an objectivity of a certain form, that is, the objectivity of a certain form constitutes that category to which the being in question belongs."

'the guidelines of Lukácsian research after the 1930s owe their immediate origin to the materialist theory of objectivity'; however, this does not necessarily mean 'that one should leave aside', in the analysis of the long period that begins in *Towards an Ontology of Social Being*, "the inconveniences and limits that derive from the absence of an explicit ontological project as a foundation. At that moment, this project is completely absent in Lukács" (OLDRINI, 2002, p. 67). Moreover, it is necessary to warn that this "turn," so to speak, although it presents substantial differences with his juvenile texts, is not "the fruit of a sudden and unexpected reversal of direction, of a turn that would have occurred suddenly, without preparation, in the last decade of the philosopher's life. On the contrary, behind it there is a long history, which deserves attention" (idem, p. 50). These intermediate phases of his thought, which include, according to Oldrini, "for instance, the Berlin or Moscow writings, the ones back in Hungary" (ibid.), deserve a more careful study, without isolating them from the wider context of his work. Evidently, such an attempt escapes the limits of the present work proposal. What matters here is to identify the theoretical furniture that relates his great *Aesthetics* to the final work.

If we note the probable existence of a connecting thread, especially between the *Aesthetics* and the *Ontology*, it does not immediately follow that Lukács adhered to the expression itself, even if, as Oldrini states, "even where the thing, the conceptual nexus already exists in germ, there is no word to express it" (idem, p. 67). In truth, Lukács nurtured serious distrust and suspicion in relation to the word itself, resisting to use it; "for him, taking the connotation given to it by Heidegger, it has only a negative value" (ibidem). However, when he came into contact with Ernst Bloch's

*Fundamental Questions of Philosophy. On the Ontology of Not Yet Being (nochnicht-seins)*, published in 1961, and Nicolai Hartmann's voluminous work on Ontology, the author's position on the word changes. Tertulian, quoted by Oldrini, goes so far as to state "that Hartmann's ontological writings played the role of a catalyst in Lukács' thinking; they certainly instilled in him the idea of seeking the foundations of his thought through ontology and its categories" (Tertulian apud idem, p. 68).

Thus, the approach to Aesthetics changes its configuration: although chronologically it was elaborated before the Ontology, there are clear indications that make feasible the hypothesis that, in logical terms, the ontological problems were already present, even if this expression was not used, either because Lukács associated it with existentialism or because he himself had not realized the possibility of an ontology on a materialist basis. Nevertheless, the fact is that "the thesis that the work of art 'is there', that it exists prior to the analysis of its conditions of possibility does not in fact represent a 'novelty' of the last Lukács" (idem, p. 70). Indeed, from the author's own statement we can see this link between the analysis of the work of art and questions of ontological order. In his 1969 preface to the French edition of *My Way to Marx* the author states: "If for Aesthetics, the philosophical starting point consists in the fact that the work of art is there, that it exists, the social and historical nature of this existence makes the whole problematic move towards a social ontology" (Lukács, 1971, apud. idem, p. 69).

It is still Tertulian (1986, p. 11) who offers us precious information about the specific moment in which the elaboration of Lukács' last work began: May 1960, the date on which, according to his plans, he would start writing the *Ethics*. However, "we know what happened afterwards: the

preparatory work on the *Ethics* turned into a voluminous manuscript, the *Ontology of Social Being*, conceived as a necessary introduction to the main work" (Tertulian, 1999, p. 126).

The Lukácsian incursion into the debate on ontology is by no means the fruit of particular or personal inclinations, but arises from the recognition that a number of theoretical questions should be addressed from a new perspective. The adversities of his time imposed—so believed the Hungarian thinker—the enormous task of returning to the work of Marx, with the aim of thoroughly reformulating the prevailing theoretical perspectives, to find answers to the mistakes caused by the Stalinist vulgarization that dominated almost every attempt at a theoretical understanding of the most important phenomena of the 20th century, in addition to the serious distortions it caused in the reception of Marx's work.

For this very reason, the last great philosophical work of Georg Lukács, *Towards an Ontology of Social Being*, constitutes within the history of Marxism a separate affair, since it departs from the common nucleus upon which Marx's work was understood throughout the whole of the last century. This work has the merit of being the first to highlight the ontological character of Marx's thought, as we have already indicated above.

The proposed return has a peculiarity vis-à-vis the whole theoretical edifice that has been built upon Marxian propositions: it is an emphatic assertion that 'no one has occupied himself as much as Marx with the ontology of social being', as we have already stressed above. It starts from the denunciation that the ontological character of Marxian thought was obscured by the dogmatic rigidity in which Marxism found itself immersed

and which rejected any discussion of ontology as idealistic or simply metaphysical. Actually, as Lukács himself suggests, ontology is nothing but a specific strand of the logical-epistemological reflections that have come to dominate the philosophical field since the 17th century,<sup>5</sup> which vigorously combats “every attempt to base philosophical thinking about the world upon being,” stating “as non-scientific every question in relation to being” (LUKÁCS, 1984, p. 7; 1990, t. I, p. 3). No matter how antagonistic they may be in relation to their philosophical principles, both are perspectives stiffened and reduced by the same constraints, since they are founded within logical-gnosiological discussions and, precisely because of this, both are incapable of realizing that the structuring core of Marxian thought are ontological lineaments concerning social being.

Lukács' entire ontological writings have two basic directions: he turns against the mechanistic readings stemming mainly from Stalinism and vulgar Marxism and, at the same time, he seeks to combat the criticism of Marx's opponents, showing how the misunderstanding -and even the refusal- of any ontology is circumscribed by the pressing needs of the very configuration of capitalist society:

The combat suggested by Lukács against the predominance of logical-epistemological reflections has, therefore, a perspective which reconciles the theoretical position with practical necessity. Against the manipulative predominance to which science has been relegated to in the world of capital, ontology repositions the essential philosophical problem of man's being and destiny and his contradictory self-constitution.

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5 “After 1848, after the decline of Hegelian philosophy and, above all, when the triumphal march of neo-Kantianism and positivism began, ontological problems are no longer understood. Neo-Kantianism eliminated from philosophy the unknowable thing-in-itself, while for positivism the subjective perception of the world coincides with its reality” (LUKÁCS, 1984, p. 574; 1990, t. I, p. 277).

Marx's perception of ontology provides him with the necessary elements to establish once and for all the break with gnosiology. Lukács' reflections proceed from the fundamental criticism which postulates that, for Marx, 'the type and meaning of abstractions, of ideal experiments, are determined not from gnosiological or methodological (let alone logical) points of view, but from the thing itself, that is, from the ontological essence of the matter treated' (idem, p. 596; idem, p. 302).

With these words, Marx's thought reveals a fertile turning point in relation to all that had been produced by philosophy until then: "the object of Marxist ontology, unlike classical and later ontologies, is that which really exists: the task is to investigate this entity with the concern of understanding its being and finding the various degrees and connections within it." This determination establishes a break with the scientific standards prevailing since the 17th century. The newness of Marx's thought must be understood on the basis of

a structure of a completely new character: a scientificity which, in the process of generalization, never abandons this stage (existence-in-itself), and which nevertheless, in every singular adaptation to facts, in every ideal reproduction of a concrete nexus, continually examines the totality of social being and in this way continually weighs both the reality and the meaning of each singular phenomenon; an ontological-philosophical consideration of the existing reality in itself which does not wander over the phenomena, hypostatizing the abstractions, but, on the contrary, sets itself critically and self-critically on the highest level of consciousness, only to take each existence in its own full form of being, specific to it. We believe that Marx has thus created both a new form of general scientism and a new form of ontology, destined in the future to overcome the profoundly problematic constitution of modern scientism, despite all the richness of the facts discovered. (idem, p. 572; idem, p. 275).

This new characterization of scientificity is described in a simple but consequential way: "categories are forms and determinations of existence". In this way, Lukács states, on the one hand, that the categories and connections proper to being take on the character of a critical metre in the process of constructing abstractions.

And, concluding conclusively, Lukács distinguishes the "old philosophy" from the philosophy of Marx:

Marxism distinguishes itself in very clear terms from previous conceptions of the world: for Marxism the categorical being of the thing constitutes the whole being of the thing, while in the old philosophies the categorical being was the fundamental category within which the categories of reality developed. It is not that history develops within the system of categories, but rather that history is the transformation of the system of categories. The categories are, in short, forms of being (LUKÁCS, 1986, p. 85).

Being is not an abstract category, insofar as it is understood as a concrete totality dialectically articulated into partial totalities. This constitutive structure of being, which Lukács calls a "complex of complexes"—borrowing Nicolai Hartmann's terminology—always presents itself by means of an intricate interaction of the elements within each complex. The complex within this perspective is understood and determined as an articulated set of categories that mutually determine each other, and are decisively structured by a category that acts as a preponderant moment within it. Thus, the "universal processuality of being derives not only from the complicated interaction of the 'elements' (complexes) within each complex and of the complexes among themselves, but from the presence each time of a *übergreifendes Moment* which

provides the objective direction of the process, which is thus configured as a historical process" (SCARPONI, 1976, p. XIII).

This confrontation—theoretical and practical—forms the basis of the argument that warns of the need for a return to Marx, unshackled by Marxism in general. The point is to sweep away from the pages of Marx's work a discussion which is totally foreign to its letter: statements which accuse Marx of the existence of an univocal determinism, coming from the sphere of economics, which absolutizes the potency of the economic factor, leaving the efficacy of other complexes of social life to the background. In contrast to the univocal determinism of the economic sphere over the other instances of social life, as most of his adversaries accuse him of, the structural core of Marx's economic thought is based on the conception of the reciprocal determination of the categories which make up the complex of social being:

This peculiar, paradoxical, seldom understood dialectical method rests on Marx's already touted conviction, according to which, within social being the economic and the extra-economic continually become one another, being in an unbearable reciprocal interaction, from which, as we have shown, neither an extraordinary historical development deprived of laws nor a mechanical domination 'imposed by law' of the abstract and pure economic derives. (LUKÁCS, 1984, p.585 1990, t. I, p. 290-1).

They are, therefore, moments that present themselves permanently in a state of reflexive determination. It is the interaction and interrelation of these elements that constitute the structure upon which the process of the socialization of man is moved and dynamized. The categories of production and reproduction of life—economic sphere—develop the central motor function of this dynamic, however, they can only develop in the form of an

ontologically primary moment of an interaction between the complexes that come to exist in the objective dialectic between chance and necessity.

The economic base always remains the preponderant moment, yet this does not eliminate the relative autonomy of the superstructures, which is definitively expressed in the dialectic of mutual determinative reciprocity existing between these and the economic sphere. Thus, the superstructural spheres of society are not simply epiphenomena of the economic structure. Far from constituting a passive reflex, these structures can act (or retroact upon) the material base to a greater or lesser degree, always, however, within the 'conditions, possibilities or impediments' that the latter determines for them.

What characterizes and determines the specificity of human activity is the fact that it is a "posited activity," that is, it is the objective configuration of a previously conceived end—a teleological end. Labour is thus understood as the unity between the effective positing of a given objectivity and the prior ideal activity directly governed and mediated by a specific end. Lukács defines the final result of labour as a "posited causality", which means that it is a causality set in motion by the mediation of a humanly-configured end. In labour activity these two categories, though antagonistic and heterogeneous, form a unity inside the whole. Therefore, on the one hand, the causal posited, and on the other, the teleological positing, constitute, in the form of reflexive determination, the ontological foundation of the dynamism of complexes proper only to man, inasmuch as teleology is a category existing only in the sphere of social being. Therefore, by defining the teleological setting as the generating cell of social life, and seeing in its development and complexification the dynamic content of social totality, Lukács makes it impossible to confuse

the guidelines and principles governing the life of nature and the life of society: "the first is dominated by spontaneous causality, non-teleological by definition, while the second is constituted by the work of finalist acts of individuals" (TERTULIAN, 1990, p. XX).

After these determinations concerning the genetic foundations of the ontology of social being, Lukács demonstrates how these same teleological acts can appear in a differentiated form when the object on which their actions are focused is considered. The fundamental difference between these acts is fundamentally related to the object on which they exert their action. Primary teleological acts have an immediate impact on a given object or natural element, while secondary teleological acts have as their finality the consciousness of other men, that is, "they are no longer immediate interventions on objects of nature, but intend to provoke these interventions on the part of other people" (LUKÁCS, 1984, p.46; 1990, t. II, p. 56).

It is the analysis of these distinct forms of teleological acts that enables us to understand the development process of the higher stages from the original form of labour. The dynamics inherent in the catechetical interactions of labour not only establish a human origin, but determine the dynamics of the higher forms of social practice. Within these higher forms of society, they occupy a prominent place and assume the leading role in the dynamics of this process. The so-called secondary teleological acts become more "dematerialised" since they are detached from the direct relationship with the material moment of social practice. It is these acts, also called socio-teleological acts, which later give rise to important dimensions of social practice, such as ethics, ideology, education and even

—and this is a crucial question for Lukács—we can glimpse from it the genesis of political actions.

Both the question of labour and the complexification of the dynamics of human society with the advent of higher forms of social life such as human formation, understood in the broadest sense of the term, are treated prevalently from the point of view of the reciprocal determination and the overcoming of heterogeneity between teleology and causality. These categories form, within Lukácsian elaborations, the analytical basis of all social action. Similarly, we identify another Lukácsian stratagem: the whole social process is set in motion by means of individual teleological actions, although these acts as a whole do not have a determined purpose, hence an entire movement that operates through spontaneous causal links. This affirmation leads us, therefore—and here it is worth emphasizing this determination in all clarity—to understand that at the level of the totality of social being there is present a whole network of connections acting in the form of a social causality. This fact leads the Hungarian thinker, through these determinations, to take a position contrary to tendencies within Marxism itself and also against Hegelian philosophy, by asserting the non-existence of a teleology in history.

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